Black Swans, Ostriches, and Ponzi Schemes by Rapoport, Nancy B.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 42
Issue 4 Symposium: A Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue:
White Collar Fraud, Asset Forfeiture, and Bankruptcy
Article 8
June 2012
Black Swans, Ostriches, and Ponzi Schemes
Nancy B. Rapoport
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nancy B. Rapoport, Black Swans, Ostriches, and Ponzi Schemes, 42 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (2012).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss4/8
 627 
 
ARTICLE 
BLACK SWANS, OSTRICHES, AND  
PONZI SCHEMES* 
NANCY B. RAPOPORT** 
What did he know, and when did he know it? 
 
—Howard Baker (referring to Richard  
Nixon during Watergate)1 
A few months ago, two different federal district court judges in the 
Southern District of New York went two different ways on the issue of 
whether the Madoff investors ran the risk of having to disgorge both their 
“on the book” profits—much of which would be fictional profits only—
and the principal that they invested with Madoff.2  In Picard v. Merkin 
(In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC), the district court 
ruled that the complaint filed by Madoff trustee Irving Picard, which 
alleges fraudulent transfers based on both actual and constructive fraud, 
could survive a motion to dismiss.3  Judge Wood held that, when it 
comes to fraudulent transfers under both the Bankruptcy Code and New 
York state law, it’s the intent of the debtor-transferor that matters, not the 
* © Nancy B. Rapoport 2012.  All rights reserved. 
** Gordon Silver Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas.  This Article was made possible in part by the research support of the Boyd School of 
Law.  Special thanks go to Jack Ayer, Jessica Gabel, Karen Gebbia, Jennifer Gross, Nettie Mann, 
Morris Rapoport, Bill Rochelle, and Jeff Van Niel for their comments on earlier drafts. 
 1 See Howard Baker, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Howard_Baker (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2011). 
 2 A third recent case, Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), also 
weighed in on this issue, ultimately ruling that the trustee didn’t have standing to pursue all of the 
claims.  In the one paragraph of the opinion that I liked, the court referred to the Trustee as working 
“relentlessly.”  Id. at 88. 
 3 Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), No. 11 MC 0012(KMW), 
2011 WL 3897970 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011). 
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intent of the transferee.4  She also held that the section 546(e) safe harbor 
defense5 wasn’t a “get out of court free” card (my words, not hers) at this 
stage of the proceeding, either, because the bankruptcy court had not yet 
determined whether the safe harbor applied. 
Less than a month later, in Picard v. Katz,6 the district court 
dismissed all of Picard’s claims except the actual fraud and equitable 
subordination claims, in part by finding that Madoff’s firm “was a 
registered securities brokerage firm, a fact that directly invokes certain 
‘safe harbor’ provisions of the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”7  Judge Rakoff 
decided as a matter of law that section 546(e) had kicked in, thereby 
eliminating Picard’s preference and constructive fraud claims.  He 
further held that the investors’ principal was safe from recovery absent 
any actual bad faith by an investor, but that the fictional profits might be 
recovered:8 
[W]hile as to payments received by the defendants from Madoff 
Securities equal to a return of their principal[,] defendants can defeat 
the Trustee’s claim of actual fraud simply by proving their good faith, 
as to payments received by the defendants in excess of their 
principal[,] defendants can defeat the Trustee’s claim of actual fraud 
only by showing that they not only were proceeding in good faith but 
also that they took for value. 
 4 Id. at *8-11.  She pointed out, though, that under New York law, the issue of the 
transferee’s intent gets more complicated.  The transferee’s intent comes into play, but just as an 
affirmative defense (or if the plaintiff is seeking attorney fees).  Id. at *12-13.  The tricky thing when 
using state law to avoid a transfer under section 544 is that state laws (by their very nature) aren’t 
uniform.  For fraudulent transfers, those state laws may be based on the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act or the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, but they may not follow UFTA/UFCA 
exactly. 
 5 Section 546(e) provides: 
Notwithstanding sections . . . 547, 548 (a)(1)(B), and 548(b) of this title, the trustee may not 
avoid a transfer that is a margin payment . . . or settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for 
the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial 
institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency, or that is a transfer made by or 
to (or for the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, 
financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency, in connection with a 
securities contract, . . . commodity contract, . . . or forward contract, that is made before the 
commencement of the case, except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this title. 
11 U.S.C.A. § 546(e) (Westlaw 2012). 
 6 Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 7 Id. at 451. 
 8 Id. at 454 (footnote omitted). 
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st deliberate 
type 
Under Judge Rakoff’s theory, I envision the fraudulent deals as 
carry
we know—about investing, period.  More importantly, 
we must examine when and how we should question our assumptions 
about inv
 
 
The court then explained that mere inquiry notice that there might have 
been fraud wouldn’t be sufficient,9 but willful blindness to the fraud 
would “constitute a lack of good faith.”10  In essence, if reasonable 
people confronted with the Madoff scheme might have been inclined to 
say, “what the hey?,” that wouldn’t matter.  Only the mo
of ignorance—the legal equivalent of plugging one’s ears while 
humming tunes—would demonstrate a lack of good faith.11 
So, depending on which court is correct, the Madoff investors either 
have several hoops to go through to establish a defense or very few 
hoops.  The applicability of the safe harbor defense is either a question of 
fact or a question of law.  If Judge Wood is correct, and the safe harbor 
defense is a question of fact, then investing in a deal that seemed too 
good to be true carries significant risks.  If Judge Rakoff is correct, and 
the safe harbor defense kicks in when a business holds12 a broker’s 
license to buy and sell stock,13 then investors aren’t obliged to check out 
the bona fides of too-good-to-be-true deals unless those deals are so 
obviously fraudulent that no one could ever mistake them for legitimate 
deals.  (
ing legends saying, “Warning!  I am not a real deal.  Invest at your 
peril.”) 
To me, the issue involves that very Howard Baker-ish inquiry of 
what the investors knew and when they knew it.  In order to resolve that 
issue, we have to ask ourselves what clues there were to the Ponzi 
scheme that Madoff ran.  And to do that, we must examine what we 
know—or think 
esting. 
Before the discovery of Australia, people in the Old World were 
convinced that all swans were white, an unassailable belief as it 
seemed completely confirmed by empirical evidence.  The sighting of 
the first black swan might have been an interesting surprise for a few 
ornithologists (and others extremely concerned with the coloring of 
 9 Id. at 455. 
 10 Id. at 454 (footnote omitted).  I have to admit that I was a bit surprised by the court’s 
led Judge Rakoff’s ruling. 
kerage firm, a fact that directly 
’t seem to bother 
rhetorical question: “But why would defendants willfully blind themselves to the fact that they had 
invested in a fraudulent enterprise?”  Id.  There are a lot of reasons why the defendants might have 
done just that, as this essay discusses. 
 11 The Madoff trustee has appea
 12 “. . . Madoff Securities was a registered securities bro
invokes certain ‘safe harbor’ provisions of the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”  Id. at 451. 
 13 The fact that Madoff may not have actually been buying securities didn
the court. 
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om observations or 
xperience and the fragility of our knowledge.  One single observation 
can invalidate a gen
confirmatory sightings of millions of whi
one single (and, I am told, quite ugly) black bird. 
he can’t figure out the market (nor can anyone 
else), and t 
buyi gh 
shee
ted 
entirely on the existence of black swans, on the possibility of some 
 
birds), but that is not where the significance of the story lies.  It 
illustrates a severe limitation to our learning fr
e
eral statement derived from millennia of 
te swans.  All you need is 
 
—Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact  
of the Highly Improbable14 
On long drives, I like to listen to books on CD, and I’ve been 
listening to Malcolm Gladwell’s book What the Dog Saw and Other 
Adventures.15  In the chapter Blowing Up: How Nassim Taleb Turned the 
Inevitability of Disaster Into An Investment Strategy,16 Gladwell 
describes Nassim Taleb’s approach to investing.  The gist of the chapter 
is that Taleb believes that 
 so, instead, he’s developed a system of managing risks withou
ng into the fallacy that he can somehow beat the system throu
r brainpower. 
Empirica [Taleb’s company] follows a very particular 
investment strategy.  It trades options, which is to say that it deals not 
in stocks and bonds but with bets on stocks and bonds . . . . 
. . . . 
Taleb . . . has constructed a trading philosophy predica
random, unexpected event sweeping the markets.  He never sells 
options, then.  He only buys them . . . .  [H]e buys options on both 
sides, on the possibility of the market moving both up and down.17 
Countless gurus (and Madoff was one of them, albeit a fake one) 
contend that they can beat the system—that, based on their own analysis, 
they can determine how to make scads of money due to their choice of 
which stocks to buy, sell, or hold.18  The problem is that they confuse 
correlation with causation.  (Or, in Madoff’s case, the problem was that 
 
 14 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 
2
HAT THE DOG SAW: AND OTHER ADVENTURES (2009). 
nd swears by Jim Cramer’s approach: doing some serious homework before and 
fter in
xvii ( 007) [hereinafter TALEB]. 
 15 MALCOLM GLADWELL, W
 16 Id. at 51. 
 17 Id. at 58. 
 18 My husba
a vesting in a company.  (When we watch Cramer’s show, though, I don’t swear by him; I 
swear at him.  And what on earth does “booyah!” mean?) 
4
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he w
” are 
even
ow human beings.  
But I ags that signal 
a fraud.  With many schemes to disguise the financial statements of 
underper but 
peop ey 
beca
 
 
as flat-out lying.)  The gurus assume that their stock market profits 
are caused by their understanding of how a particular company runs its 
business.  Balderdash.  They buy and sell; some of their investments 
work out and some don’t.  The analysis may correlate with their profits, 
but it doesn’t cause them. 
Just because a person has managed to make some money on a 
particular stock at a particular time doesn’t mean that he has figured out 
a way to beat the stock market.19  What counts is his willingness to look 
for counter-factual evidence as a way of cross-checking his 
assumptions.20  He needs to look for “black swans.”  “Black swans
ts that involve three components: (1) they are wildly unusual events 
(2) with big ramifications (3) that we rationalize as “normal” after the 
fact.21  One such black swan is the investment that never, ever shows a 
loss.  That particular black swan is a signal to abandon ship (as Jim 
Cramer puts it, “sell, sell, sell”) and run hard in the other direction. 
That’s why I have less sympathy than might be seemly for the 
people who invested with Bernie Madoff.22  I feel horrible that many of 
them lost their life savings.  I feel bad for them as fell
 wonder why so many smart people ignored the red fl
forming (or fictional) businesses, there were red flags, 
le choose not to see them.  They miss the black swans.  In fact, th
me ostriches by burying their heads in the sand.23 
Irving Picard sees ostriches in the Madoff story, too: 
 19 For years, we were “Baby Berkshire” shareholders because we liked Warren Buffett’s 
vestm
to pay attention to things like how a company behaves, 
vii-xviii. 
k out Jack Ayer’s analysis of whether the Madoff investors actually 
K, ostriches don’t really bury their heads in the sand.  See AMERICAN OSTRICH 
SSOCI
in ent philosophy.  We still like Mr. Buffett as a person, but we sold the stock when the returns 
lagged the market for several quarters. 
 20 Of course, it makes sense 
especially after some big-name companies like Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom have imploded in very 
public ways.  For many of us, our confidence in companies’ financial statements were shaken when 
we read news story after news story on the type of financial engineering that misled investors.  
Paying attention to obvious clues is important—who wants to invest in a company that’s poorly run 
or downright rotten? 
 21 TALEB, at x
 22 I’m not alone.  Chec
did lose “everything.”  See Bernie’s Investors: Did They Lose “Everything?”, UNDERBELLY BLOG 
(Dec. 15, 2008, 1:06 PM), http://underbelly-buce.blogspot.com/2008/12/bernies-investors-did-they-
lose.html. 
 23 O
A ATION, www.ostriches.org/factor.html#head (last visited Dec. 18, 2011).  But from a 
distance, apparently, it can look as if they do.  For the best opinion using pictures of an ostrich and a 
human, both burying their heads in the sand, see Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-1665, 
2011 WL 5924441 (7th Cir. Nov. 23, 2011), available at 
www.abajournal.com/files/DG0R2WE8.pdf.  OK, it’s the only such opinion, but it’s a marvelous 
opinion just the same. 
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roduced negative returns for nearly 
hs—Sterling’s KW BLMIS Accounts rarely reported negative 
mont
iods of market dislocation, which 
should have caused the Sterling Partners to question Madoff’s 
Circuit did, too.28  As between those creditors who had the tools to figure 
 
The Sterling Partners knew or should have known that Madoff’s 
fund was too good to be true because it consistently yielded positive 
gains coupled with ultra low volatility. Between 1998 and 2008—a 
period during which the S&P 100 p
60 mont
hly rates of return. During that same ten-year period, of the 483 
KW BLMIS Accounts administered by Sterling, none purportedly 
experienced more than five down months, and many purportedly 
never had a single down month. 
. . . . 
The disconnect between Madoff’s returns and the equity market 
was particularly obvious during per
prophetic market timing. Remarkably, Sterling’s BLMIS investments 
were effectively immune from any number of market catastrophes, 
enjoying steady rates of return at times when the rest of the market 
was experiencing financial crises.24 
In the Sterling litigation, as in the Katz and Merkin litigation, Picard 
seeks to recover certain transfers under sections 544(b), 547, 548, and 
550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and under state law.25  His attempt to get 
the Madoff investors to pay back into the estate any fictional profits that 
they earned, with some clawback periods going as far back as six years,26 
is the right approach.27  I’m not the only one saying that: the Second 
 
 24 Complaint at 193-95, Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re 
ernar , LLC), Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2010), 
ard-wins-ruling-on-calculating-
 federal appeals court in New York said today that trustee Irving Picard can 
cal al 
pla
 
s within the meaning of SIPA. The 
B d L. Madoff Inv. Sec.
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/0204sterlingcompaintfinal.PDF [hereinafter 
Sterling Complaint] (on file with the Golden Gate University Law Review). 
 25 Id. at 205-364. 
 26 The Sterling Complaint uses reachback periods of ninety days for some counts (the 
preference counts), two years for others (the federal fraudulent transfer counts), and six years for still 
others (the state law fraudulent transfer counts).  See id. at iii-iv. 
 27 His theory is called the net-investment approach.  Bob Van Voris & Linda Sandler, Madoff 
Trustee Picard Wins Ruling on Calculating Losses, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 16, 2011, available at 
www.businessweek.com/news/2011-08-16/madoff-trustee-pic
losses.html (“The
culate losses by subtracting the amount withdrawn from an investor’s account from the tot
ced with Madoff, the so-called net investment method.”). 
28  
In satisfying customer claims in this case, Mr. Picard, as the SIPA Trustee, determined that 
the claimants are customers with claims for securitie
Trustee further concluded that each customer’s “net equity” should be calculated by the “Net 
Investment Method,” crediting the amount of cash deposited by the customer into his or her 
BLMIS account, less any amounts withdrawn from it. 
6
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ample, any tort creditors), my vote goes to the 
creditors who had zero chance to bail out in time.  There are valid 
nvestments that 
were too good to be true. 
I. 
hile bad business strat
contribute to a compan
use accounting tricks to hide bad decisions th
 
savvy investor might have 
seen some patterns.  At some point after Rich Kinder left Enron, all sorts 
of f n’t 
any 
 
 
out that something fishy was going on and any other types of creditors 
without those tools (for ex
reasons to penalize investors who chose to stick with i
RED FLAGS AND BLACK SWANS—AND OSTRICHES 
W egy and bad investment decisions can and do 
y’s fall, it is a company’s desperate attempt to 
at often seals its fate. 
—Bala G. Dharan, Enron’s Accounting Issues:  
What Can We Learn to  
Prevent Future Enrons?29 
Hearken back to the first wave of accounting scandals in this 
century: the Enrons and WorldComs and their ilk.  Although an investor 
would have to have been paying close attention to the financial 
statements that these companies produced,30 a 
inancial indicators started to go haywire.  For example, there were
blips in Enron’s cash flow from earnings: 
One of the most common measures of earnings quality used by 
financial analysts, debt-rating agencies, and accounting academics is 
In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Elizabeth Amon, 
Madoff Trustee Sets $272 Million Payout, Sept. 15 Record Date, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2011, 3:36 
AM), available at www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-12/jpmorgan-chase-bofa-kkr-madoff-dow-
ford-in-court-news.html. 
 29 Bala G. Dharan, Enron’s Accounting Issues: What Can We Learn to Prevent Future 
nrons
s loss of investor faith started with the company’s 2001 third quarter 
earnings
Id. 
E ?, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 113, 115 (Nancy B. Rapoport 
& Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). 
 30  
Enron’
 release on October 16, 2001. As earnings releases go, this one must rank as one of 
the most misleading. The news release said, in an underlined and capitalized headline, 
“Enron Reports Recurring Third Quarter Earnings of $0.43 per diluted shares.” The headline 
went on to reaffirm “recurring earnings” for the following year, 2002, of $2.15 per share, a 
projected increase of 19% from 2001. But an investor had to dig deep into the news release 
to know that Enron actually lost $618 million that quarter, for a loss of ($0.84) per share. A 
net loss of $618 million loss was converted to a “recurring net income” of $393 million by 
conveniently labeling and excluding $1.01 billion of expenses and losses as “non-recurring.” 
7
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sitive when net 
income is greater than CFO. When this happens, it usually indicates 
 fact, Enron ensured by whatever means necessary that the annual 
reported CFO always exceeded the net income . . . .31 
To m at 
shou igh 
alert
ad to 
wait until after the markets closed on October 16, 2001, when the 
was described as a $1 billion correction of an accounting error.  
 
the so-called accruals, which is the difference between net income and 
cash flow from operations (“CFO”). Accruals are po
poor earnings quality issues. Interestingly, Enron was apparently very 
aware of the importance of CFO for analysts and bond rating agencies. 
In
ake matters worse, Enron omitted some important information th
ld have put the stock analysts (and Enron shareholders) on h
. 
Enron’s 2001 third quarter earnings press release, on October 16, 
2001, contained another major shortcoming—lack of information 
about its balance sheet and cash flows. While the company’s press 
release provided information on net income, the company failed to 
provide a balance sheet. This is inexplicable—we teach in Accounting 
101 that the income statement and the balance sheet are interrelated 
(“articulated”) statements. This essentially means that we cannot 
really prepare one without preparing the other. Not surprisingly, 
almost every major company’s earnings release contains the balance 
sheet along with its income statement. Financially responsible 
companies would also provide a cash flow statement. Analysts and 
investors puzzled with Enron’s lack of balance sheet disclosure h
senior management disclosed—in response to a question during the 
earnings conference call—that it had taken a $1.2 billion charge 
against its shareholders’ equity (a balance sheet item), including what 
32
One billion dollars is a heck of an “oops,” and investors and analysts 
who read about this particular “oops” should have dug deeper into how 
the “error” occurred.33  I know that accounting is an art, not a science,34 
 
 31 Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and 
Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 97, 109 (Nancy 
B. oport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (emphasis added); see also id. at 110 (“As the data 
illustrate for the year 2000, Enron reserved almost all of its finan
 Rap
cial management of cash flow data 
 the ’s cash flow from 
operations f nd 
199
  
EN
 
f revenue 
to fourth quarter. Similar troubling contrasts in the behavior of Enron
or Quarters 1–3 and Quarter 4 existed for previous years as well, including 1998 a
9.”). 
32 Dharan, Enron’s Accounting Issues: What Can We Learn to Prevent Future Enrons?, in
RON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS at 116. 
33 Jim Chanos dug deeper into Enron, and he didn’t like what he dug up. 
Given that Enron’s net income margins had also declined from over 4% o
to less than 1%, the negative free cash flows should have been a major red flag for any 
8
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and high-magnitude errors do occur.  But when they do, it’s important to 
make sure that the errors are, well, really errors, rather than lies. 
I don’t expect normal people35 to go around scrutinizing company 
financial statements looking for accounting signals of possible 
misrepresentation.  And part of Enron’s collapse was due to the failure of 
many analysts (and rating agencies)36 to question Enron and to publicize 
 
analyst trying to value Enron’s equity. It certainly caught the attention of hedge fund 
manager Jim Chanos of Kynikos. He was quoted as saying, “No one could explain how 
Enron actually made money . . . . Not only was Enron surprisingly unprofitable, but its cash 
s and other complex transactions aggressively to the same end. It masked poorly 
form
 and Why Similar 
udit F
h requires enterprises, and their auditors, to 
al judgment in preparing and auditing financial statements.”). 
 35 No ot 
tha
 
eover, a thorough inquiry into these dealings also should include the major 
ial market “gatekeepers” involved with Enron: accounting firms, banks, law firms, and 
credit ra
With respect to Enron, all of these gatekeepers have questions to answer about the 
money t
ly from a web of legal rules that essentially requires securities issuers to 
flow from operations seemed to bear little resemblance to reported earnings.” 
Dharan & Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and Key Financial Measures, in 
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS at 111 (quoting Bethany McLean, Why 
Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58) (footnotes omitted); see also Andrew Hill, Enron: 
Virtual Company, Virtual Profits, FT.COM (Feb. 3, 2002), available at 
http://specials.ft.com/enron/FT3648VA9XC.html (“Enron bolstered profits by booking income 
immediately on contracts that would take up to 10 years to complete.  It shifted debts into 
partnerships it created and in effect controlled, even though defined by auditors as off balance sheet.  
It used such entities to manipulate its accounts at the end of each quarter and employed financial 
derivative
per ing assets with rapid deal-making.”).  In fact, at some point, we were probably all on notice 
that financial statements might not be as accurate as they had seemed.  See supra text accompanying 
note 20. 
 34 See, e.g., Matthew J. Barrett, Enron and Andersen—What Went Wrong
A ailures Could Happen Again, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS at 
158 (“Accounting remains an art, not a science, whic
exercise profession
t that accountants are abnormal.  They’re not any more abnormal than lawyers—n
t that’s saying much. 
36  
Mor
financ
ting agencies.  Employees of these firms are likely to have knowledge of these 
transactions. 
. . . . 
hey received, the quality of their work, and the extent of their conflicts of 
interest. . . . 
. . . . 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the three major credit rating agencies—
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch/IBCA—received substantial, but as yet undisclosed, 
fees from Enron. Yet just weeks prior to Enron’s bankruptcy filing—after most of the 
negative news was out and Enron’s stock was trading at just $3 per share—all three agencies 
still gave investment grade ratings to Enron’s debt.  The credit rating agencies in particular 
have benefitted great
obtain ratings from them (and them only), and at the same time protects those agencies from 
outside competition and liability under the securities law. They are at least partially to blame 
for ron mess. the En
Frank Partnoy, Enron and the Derivatives World, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS at 177-78. 
9
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their
ice to 
ignore accessible information makes us ostriches.   And voluntarily 
II. 
es” are those unsecured creditors with priority claims that 
must
wildly implausible positive returns were among those who 
 
 
 misgivings.  Most analysts didn’t do enough parsing of Enron’s 
financial statements.  But some did.37 
The key for those of us with little to no accounting background isn’t 
to learn accounting principles.  It’s to read news stories and ask 
questions.  It’s to be skeptical when things look too good to be true.  
When a magazine like Fortune runs stories like Is Enron Overpriced?,38 
that information is available and accessible to all of us.  Our cho
39
becoming an ostrich—a know-nothing—must have consequences. 
“HAVES” AND “HAVE NOTS” IN TERMS OF SECOND CHANCES 
In bankruptcy, we often have the “haves” (e.g., fully secured 
creditors with collateral that goes up in value over time)40 and the “have 
nots” (e.g., unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy in which the estate runs 
out of money before paying anything to the unsecureds).  Even among 
unsecured creditors, we can also have “haves” and “have nots.”  The 
classic “hav
 be paid in full before claims lower down the pecking order get 
anything.41 
But there’s another way of thinking about this “haves” / “have nots” 
distinction: on the one hand, there are those unsecured creditors who saw 
the light at the end of the tunnel, realized that the light was actually an 
oncoming train,42 and had a chance to get out of the way before the train 
hit them; and, on the other hand, there are those who were flattened by 
the train before they could even see it coming.  Those Madoff investors 
who saw their 
 37 Jim Chanos and Bethany McLean come to mind.  And in the Madoff scandal, so does 
Harry Markopolos, who tried to alert the SEC to Madoff’s shenanigans.  See, e.g., Allan Chernoff, 
an, Is Enron Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, available at 
yze 
gs, and then jumped up and down on our backs before it flew off, chuckling to itself. 
Madoff Whistleblower Blasts SEC, CNN MONEY, Feb. 24, 2009, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/04/news/newsmakers/madoff_whistleblower/. 
 38 Bethany McLe
http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/13/news/companies/enronoriginal_fortune/index.htm. 
 39 My dad, who is a chemist, said that the most difficult part of any experiment is to anal
the parts that go “right,” and to ask yourself if they went “right” because they were right, or because 
of luck or another factor. 
 40 Unlike our home’s value.  Now that was a black swan that swam over, bit us hard, hit us 
with its win
 41 For the distribution scheme in bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C.A. § 507 (Westlaw 2012). 
 42 “The light at the end of the tunnel is just the light of an oncoming train.” Robert Lowell 
Quotes, GOODREADS, www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/36912.Robert_Lowell (last visited Dec. 
18, 2011). 
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al investments only appreciate in value.   My husband and I 
have
d the  reason that I can’t think of one is 
that 
people had access to 
all s
 
“had” a chance to escape before the Ponzi scheme escalated.43  They just 
didn’t take it. 
Few re 44
 a few.  Our joint savings account, with its measly interest rate, is 
one.  Our CDs and T-bills are others.  All of these types of investments, 
though, are exceptionally low-risk, and their low returns reflect that low 
risk. 
But I can’t think of a single investment based on the stock market 
that always makes a profit.  An 45
I know that, in every good investment, profits ebb and flow.  I don’t 
expect every quarterly return to show steady growth, especially not in the 
double-digits.  I know that an all-growth, all-the-time return isn’t even a 
black swan.  It’s a plaid one.46 
So the very wealthy people47 who begged and pleaded with Bernie 
Madoff to handle their investments, who gave him their money in 
exchange for the faux double-digit returns on their investments, and who 
bought into the idea that Madoff “knew” the market, should have known 
that something was peculiar.  Those very wealthy 
orts of other advisors who could have questioned the Madoff 
investment strategy.  Those selfsame very wealthy people could have 
used their leverage to ask Madoff for more information.  They had a 
chance to get out of the train tunnel.  They didn’t.48 
 
 43 The trick, as my buddy Jessica Gabel has pointed out, is in figuring out where to draw the 
line between the “had-a-chance-to-get-outs” and the “never-could-have-had-a-clue” folks.  Those are 
subjective decisions, and based on how things are going right now in the Southern District of New 
York, those decisions may well depend on which judge draws the case. 
owledge or a failure of imagination, but I’m not 
reasonably certain that no plaid swans exist, except perhaps in law school 
ypoth
 Madoff is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 20
 
s possible that people other than the very wealthy could have figured out the 
arnin
undation was one of the investors. 
 44 Cf. supra notes 40 and 42. 
 45 Other reasons might include a lack of kn
going to explore either of those two in this Article. 
 46 I’m 
h eticals. 
 47 During Madoff’s sentencing, there were several references to middle-class investors who 
had been harmed by his actions.  See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Judge Explains 150-Year Sentence for 
Madoff, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, available at www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/nyregion/judge-
denny-chin-recounts-his-thoughts-in-bernard-madoff-sentencing.html?pagewanted=all; Diana B. 
Henriques, 09, 
available at
www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html?scp=1&sq=madoff%20sentencing&st=cse; 
Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Madoff Sentenced to 150 Years, WASH. POST, June 30, 2009, 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/29/AR2009062902015.html.  I’m not as 
sure that middle-class investors had easy access to the types of advisors who could have warned their 
clients about Madoff’s red flags, but, based on seeing the type of research that my husband does 
before investing, it’
w g signs, too. 
 48 It breaks my heart that Elie Wiesel’s fo
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faux 
profi
lies), is very different from 
fraud that’s out in the open.  If those early investors made real money, 
and t e statements tha ked like real (read: 
norm l) investments, th ose profits.  The line 
between investors who should s who 
should be subject to a clawback of their “profits”51 is necessarily fuzzy, 
but i i  this continuu
 
And because they didn’t get out of the train tunnel, their faux profits 
shouldn’t be honored.  Irving Picard is correct when he insists that 
ts shouldn’t be part of the investors’ claims.49  He’s also correct—
and fair—when he suggests that, instead, the investors’ legitimate claims 
are limited to only the dollar amounts that they paid into Madoff’s 
fund.50  Any other approach would give the Madoff investors two 
rewards: their faux profits, and a jump over those unsecured creditors 
who had no way of discovering that something funny was going on. 
What about those Madoff investors who invested near the 
beginning, before the Ponzi scheme began?  Should they get their profits 
back on the theory that those profits actually were real?  That’s a tough 
call that, to me, hinges on whether any of their Madoff returns showed 
some losses.  Fraud that’s disguised, such as fraud that depicts realistic 
profits and losses (even if those figures are 
h t they received from Madoff loo
ey should be able to keep th
keep their profits and investor
a
t l es somewhere along m: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49 See supra text accompanying note 28. 
 50  
  Th be the amount deposited 
into the Madoff  shown on their account 
ew
7F0MU20110816. 
e trustee, Irving Picard, has argued that investor losses should 
firm less any withdrawals, rather than the amount
statements. 
The 2nd Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in New York agreed. 
Andr  Longstreth, Madoff Trustee’s Loss Calculation Method Upheld, REUTERS, Aug. 16, 2011, 
available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/08/16/madoff-2ndcircuit-idINN1E7
 51 I’m putting the fake “profits” in quotes to distinguish them from the real profits. 
Madoff statements to investors 
showed consistent double-
digit returns, with no losses in 
any reporting quarter (red 
flags all over the place). 
Madoff statements to 
investors showed some 
profits and some losses 
(enough to look like real 
returns). 
 
Clawb
arou
acks should star
nd here, dependin
relevant reachback pe
t somewhere 
g on the 
riods. 
        Earlier in the Madoff scheme       Later on in the Madoff scheme 
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oint, the investors really should have known.  My conclusion puts 
me squarely in the Merkin camp53 and not the Katz camp,54 mostly 
dunk  question of law, to be decided before any 
evidence gets introduced.55  Without a safe harbor defense, we’re back to 
the “
le (mostly rich ones), made them yearn for a 
scarc
llan Stanford Ponzi 
sche
 
Limiting the reach of the clawbacks to some point at which the investors 
should have known that they should have been asking Madoff a few 
questions puts the dividing line between the “haves” / “have nots” near 
the right place.52  There’s not going to be an exact “aha” moment but, at 
some p
because I don’t believe that the safe harbor of section 546(e) is a slam-
—and it’s definitely not a
what did they know and when did they know it” inquiry notice 
issue. 
III.  CAN WE TELL THE REAL LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL FROM 
THE ONCOMING TRAIN? 
Madoff sure seems to have known what he was doing.  He 
cultivated the right peop
e resource (letting him invest their money), and played into the 
natural human tendency to want to believe that they can beat the odds 
(with fake, double-digit, positive returns on phantom money).  He lived 
the kind of lavish lifestyle that most of us will never know, but that most 
of us wouldn’t mind having.56  Who wouldn’t want to have hung out 
with him in his heyday? 
And it wasn’t just Madoff.  News of the A
me was roughly contemporaneous with the Madoff scandal’s news,57 
and there are allegations that Société Générale ignored some of 
Stanford’s red flags.58  There are more schemes out there that we haven’t 
yet discovered, and there will be others that will begin when the Madoff 
 
 52 The exact right place is defined by the relevant statutes of limitations.  There will always 
be some people who luck out by being on the good side of a statute of limitation. 
 53 See Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), 11 MC 0012(KMW), 2011 
WL 3897970 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011). 
 54 See Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
otion for summary judgment must be 
uptcy part, and the being-subject-to-lawsuits 
art. 
57 See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges R. Allen Stanford, Stanford 
e in Stanford Case: Prosecutors Are Investigating 
hethe
 55 See 35B C.J.S. Fed. Civ. P. § 1158 (“A plaintiff’s m
denied if affirmative defenses raise matters, which, if proved, may possibly preclude a judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff as a matter of law.”). 
 56 Except for the go-to-prison part, and the bankr
p
 
International Bank for Multi-Billion Dollar Investment Scheme (Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-26.htm. 
 58 See Michael Rothfeld, Bank Prob
W r Societe Generale Ignored Suspicious Transactions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2011, available 
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904491704576572940023060486.html. 
13
Rapoport: Black Swans, Ostriches, and Ponzi Schemes
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
640 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
scan
cause we need people who are naturally curious about how 
thing
other side really produced everything that we 
requested?” 
Yet there were lawyers and business people and writers who bought 
into Madoff’s fraud.59  Natural curiosity, a facility with numbers, and 
analytical ability only work when someone with those talents uses them.  
Maybe the latest round of scandals will sharpen our focus, at least for a 
while.  The clawbacks from Ponzi investors might get our attention, at 
least for a while.  Ultimately, though, we have to keep reminding 
ourselves that there are black swans in the world.  We’ve already proven 
that there are ostriches. 
 
 
dal dies down.  There will be large-scale ones and small ones.  And 
we’ll probably keep on letting ourselves get duped. 
Humans (even really, really smart ones) have an almost unlimited 
capacity to fool ourselves, and as Nassim Taleb has pointed out, one of 
the best ways to fool ourselves is to assume that what we know is all that 
there is to know—that because all we’ve seen are white swans, no other 
types of swans could possibly exist.  Add to human nature a modern 
lessening of our ability to think critically, and you get the recipe for the 
next round of Ponzi ripoffs. 
So, critical thinking is key.  At a time when we’re questioning the 
quality of our educational system, I hear a lot about how our students 
can’t write well and how hard it is to encourage them to go into math and 
science.  That scares me.  We need good writers, and good writing calls 
for clear analytical thinking.  We need mathematicians, because we need 
people who understand how numbers relate to each other.  And we need 
scientists, be
s work and who want to find out what we don’t yet know.  We need 
people who want to ask “why.” 
We even need lawyers, not just to chase after Ponzi artists, but 
because good lawyers are always asking “what if” something might 
happen.  Good lawyers are trained to think about black swans.  Having a 
healthy dose of skepticism keeps us thinking about everything from 
“what if one of the parties wants to breach a contract this way?” to “how 
do we know that the 
 59 The list included a law dean, some universities, several prominent business people, and 
lie WE iesel’s foundation.  See Henry Blodgett, Bernie Madoff’s Victims, BUS. INSIDER, Dec. 8, 
2008, available at www.businessinsider.com/2008/12/bernie-madoff-hosed-client-list. 
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